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report

blinding prosecutors
to defendants’ race: a
policy proposal to reduce
unconscious bias in the
criminal justice system
Sunita Sah, Christopher T. Robertson, & Shima B. Baughman

abstract
Racial minorities are disproportionately imprisoned in
the United States. This disparity is unlikely to be due
solely to differences in criminal behavior. Behavioral
science research has documented that prosecutors
harbor unconscious racial biases. These unconscious
biases play a role whenever prosecutors exercise their
broad discretion, such as in choosing what crimes to
charge and when negotiating plea bargains. To reduce
this risk of unconscious racial bias, we propose a policy
change: Prosecutors should be blinded to the race of
criminal defendants wherever feasible. This could be
accomplished by removing information identifying or
suggesting the defendant’s race from police dossiers
shared with prosecutors and by avoiding mentions of
race in conversations between prosecutors and defense
attorneys. Race is almost always irrelevant to the merits
of a criminal prosecution; it should be omitted from the
proceedings whenever possible for the sake of justice.

proposal
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absract. Racial minorities are disproportionately imprisoned in the United
States. This disparity is unlikely to be due solely to differences in criminal
behavior. Behavioral science research has documented that prosecutors
harbor unconscious racial biases. These unconscious biases play a role
whenever prosecutors exercise their broad discretion, such as in choosing
what crimes to charge and when negotiating plea bargains. To reduce this
risk of unconscious racial bias, we propose a policy change: Prosecutors
should be blinded to the race of criminal defendants wherever feasible. This
could be accomplished by removing information identifying or suggesting
the defendant’s race from police dossiers shared with prosecutors and
by avoiding mentions of race in conversations between prosecutors and
defense attorneys. Race is almost always irrelevant to the merits of a criminal
prosecution; it should be omitted from the proceedings whenever possible
for the sake of justice.

P

rosecutors may have more independent power and
discretion than any other government officials in the
United States.1 Prosecutors decide whether to initiate
criminal proceedings, what charges to file or bring
before a grand jury, how and when to prosecute individuals, and what penalties to seek. For a given criminal
behavior, half a dozen charges might apply, ranging
from minor misdemeanors to the most serious felonies.
A prosecutor can decline to press charges altogether or
stack charges by characterizing the same behavior as
i
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violating the law dozens of times (charging each phone
call made as part of a drug transaction as a crime, for
instance). Once charged, about 95% of criminal cases
are resolved through plea bargaining, where prosecutors
can defer prosecution, suspend a sentence, minimize
factual allegations in ways that virtually guarantee a light
sentence, or insist on the most severe penalties. 2 If a
case does go to trial, a prosecutor’s sentencing demand
provides an influential reference point (an anchor) for a
defense attorney’s response in plea negotiations and the
judge’s final sentencing decision.3
Prosecutors typically do not need to articulate the
bases for their discretionary decisions,4,5 and these
decisions receive only minimal scrutiny from the courts.
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Although the U.S. Constitution theoretically limits the
discretion of prosecutors (to target a particular race
prejudicially, for instance), such protections are exceedingly difficult to invoke,6 especially if a prosecutor’s
unconscious rather than intentional bias is in play.7 This
context prompts us to offer an important and novel
proposal with the potential to help make the justice
system blind to race.
Prosecutors, we believe, should be unaware of
defendants’ race whenever possible. Implementing
such a significant change would be challenging, clearly.
But evidence of persistent disparities regarding the
proportion of racial minorities that are put in prison
makes the need for change apparent. And growing
evidence that prosecutors’ unconscious biases
contribute to that imbalance gives us a potentially
powerful target for efforts to produce positive and vitally
needed change.

Racial Bias in the Criminal Justice System
In 2010 in the United States, Blacks made up 38% of
all prisoners, although they made up only 12% of the
national population.8 That same year, about one in 23
Black men was in prison, compared with one in 147
White men.9 The causes of this racial disparity are many
and complex. Socioeconomic factors (poverty and
lower educational achievement, for example) play a role.
So may inequitable police behavior that, for example,
leads to Blacks being stopped and frisked more often
than Whites are.10,11
Black defendants also tend to receive harsher
sentences than White defendants do, even when both
the severity of the crime and previous criminal history
are taken into account.12 For example, harsher punishment was applied to crimes related to crack cocaine
versus powder cocaine in federal sentencing guidelines,
which tended to punish Blacks more harshly because
they were more likely to be arrested with crack cocaine
than powder cocaine. To minimize this disparate impact
on Blacks, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act in
2010, which reduced the unequal penalties and eliminated the five-year mandatory minimum sentence
for simple crack cocaine possession. This new law
addressed the racial bias perpetrated by the old regime
that led to low-level crack dealers, who were often
Black, receiving more severe sentences than wholesale
suppliers of powdered cocaine.13
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One important cause of the racial discrepancy
among prisoners, however, is bias that affects discretionary decisions made by prosecutors.14–17 A recent
review of empirical studies examining prosecutorial decision making and race found that most of the
studies suggested that the defendants’ “race directly
or indirectly influenced case outcomes, even when a
host of other legal or extra-legal factors are taken into
account.”17 Minorities, particularly Black males, “receive
disproportionately harsher treatment at each stage of
the prosecutorial decision-making process.”18 Indeed,
prosecutors in predominantly Black communities have
been shown to make racially biased decisions, such as
overcharging Black youth,19 which, in turn, perpetuates
racial stereotypes. 20,21 Further, Black children in the
United States are much more likely than White children
to be sentenced as adults,22 probably because Black
juveniles are perceived to be older and less childlike
than White juveniles. 23,24
These data do not suggest that prosecutors are
overtly racist, although some may be. Instead, research
documents that bias can infect even people with the
best of intentions, including physicians and other
professionals. 25,26 Prosecutors are humans with bounded
rationality, making decisions in a cultural milieu that
shapes their perceptions and decisions on an unconscious level.15,27,28 Generally, bias increases in ambiguous
situations,20,29–33 and as we described previously, decisions on what and how many charges to file against a
defendant are inherently ambiguous.
Behavioral science researchers have demonstrated
that people unknowingly misremember case facts in
racially biased ways.34,35 For example, there is a greater
tendency to remember aggressive actions (e.g., punches
or kicks) if a suspect is Black.34 In fact, it appears that
the more stereotypically Black a defendant is perceived
to be, the more likely that person is to be sentenced
to death.36 In one study, Stanford University students
viewed photographs of Black men, rating each one
on the degree to which the person’s appearance was
stereotypically Black. The students were told they could
base their decisions on any of the features of the photographed subjects to make their decisions, including
noses, lips, skin tone, and hair. Unbeknownst to the
students, each man in the images had been convicted
of murdering a White person. The men the students
rated as appearing more stereotypically Black were
more likely to have been sentenced to death in criminal
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proceedings.36 Other research has demonstrated that
lighter skin tones may lead to more lenient judgments
and prison sentences. 20,37
Although bias exists throughout the criminal justice
system, bias in prosecutorial decisions has a potentially disproportionate impact, given that most criminal
cases do not go to trial and prosecutors exercise such
wide discretion in handling them. One might hope that
selecting prosecutors of good faith and asking them to
behave professionally could avert racial bias. In this vein,
in 2014, the Department of Justice reaffirmed its policy
that “in making decisions . . . law enforcement officers
may not use race.”38 Such a policy, although laudable,
unfortunately cannot prevent unconscious bias.
Prosecutorial decisions are made in a more deliberative fashion than, for example, split-second decisions
made by police to shoot or not shoot. However, even
with deliberative decisions, the ability to self-regulate
bias is difficult: Moral reasoning is usually a post hoc
construction, generated after a (usually intuitive) judgment has been reached,39 often influenced by erroneous factors.40 People exhibiting bias are typically
unaware that they are doing so, and bias is often unintentional.33,41,42 Educating people on unconscious bias
often leads them to be convinced that other people are
biased but that they themselves are not.29 Accordingly,
strategies to encourage people to become less biased
are usually not sufficient.
One program that had some success in reducing
racial disparities was the 2006 Prosecution and Racial
Justice Program of the Vera Institute of Justice. Prosecutors collected and published data on defendant
and victim race for each offense category and the
prosecutorial action taken at each stage of criminal
proceedings.43 These data exposed that similarly situated defendants of different races were treated differently at each stage of discretion: initial case screening,
charging, plea offers, and final disposition. For instance,
in Wisconsin, the data showed that prosecutors were
charging Black defendants at higher rates than White
defendants for drug possession. With this information, the district attorney made an office policy to refer
suspects to drug treatment rather than charging them
in an attempt to reduce racial bias in charging. However,
this approach requires a large investment from overburdened prosecutorial offices to collect and analyze
their data to reveal trends in racial disparity. It also
requires that individual prosecutors be motivated to

consciously avoid bias or at least be motivated to appear
unbiased.44,45 This motivation is often led by societal
norms or public pressure regarding racial attitudes and
inequality, which varies by jurisdiction. There presently is
no complete solution to eliminate racial bias in prosecutorial decisions.

Blinding: An Alternative
Approach to Managing Bias
An alternative way to manage bias is to acknowledge
its existence and create institutional procedures to
prevent bias from influencing important decisions. The
psychologist Robert Rosenthal, a leading methodologist, concluded that the best way to reduce the chances
of bias unconsciously affecting decision processes is
to keep the process “as blind as possible for as long
as possible.”46
Blinding (or masking) to improve decisionmaking has
a long history in different domains. For example, having
musicians audition behind a screen decreased gender
bias and increased the acceptance rate of women
into symphony orchestras.47 In medical science, both
subjects and researchers are, whenever feasible, kept
unaware of who is in the treatment or control groups of
clinical trials, in an effort to achieve unbiased results.48
Meta-analyses have shown that such blinding reduces
the number of false positives in science experiments.49,50
Similarly, editors of scholarly journals routinely remove
authors’ names and institutions from submissions so
they can assess articles on their scientific merits alone.51
Likewise, to avoid possible favoritism, some professors
mask students’ identities on papers when grading.52
Blinding is already in use in other stages of the criminal justice process. For example, lineups are widely
acknowledged to be best conducted by an officer who
does not know which person is the suspect, so as not
to pollute the eyewitness’s perceptions.53,54 This practice
of blind administration of lineups was originally highly
controversial. Iowa State University professor Gary
Wells first proposed implementing blinding of police
to suspect lineups in 1988,55 although evidence of bias
and erroneous identification had been accumulating
for years before that. More than a decade later, in 1999,
the U.S. Department of Justice published a set of best
practices for conducting police lineups56 that excluded
blind procedures (although it acknowledged that having
investigators who did not know which person in the
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lineup was the suspect was desirable) because blinding
“may be impractical for some jurisdictions to implement” (p. 9).56 Nevertheless, individual jurisdictions
experimented with blind procedures.57 By 2014, the
National Research Council recommended unreservedly
that all lineups should be conducted with the benefits
of blinding.58
Blinding has also been recommended for forensic
scientists and other expert witnesses, so that attorneys
for either side in a case do not influence and undermine
their scientific expertise.32 More generally, the rules of
evidence (which determine what is permissible in court)
can be understood as an elaborate blinding procedure,
designed to ensure that juries are not exposed to irrelevant or unreliable evidence, recognizing that for the
purpose of assessing guilt, some factors are more prejudicial than probative.59

court while facing defendants, making blinding infeasible (unless that dynamic itself is reformed). In many
jurisdictions, however, prosecutors do not see defendants in person when making initial charging decisions;
these are based on information provided in police
dossiers, in which race could be redacted. In fact, the
trend is for such information to be conveyed to prosecutors electronically, making it easier to filter the race
information, perhaps automatically by electronic tools
or by intermediaries. In either case, race information
could be retained for other uses such as identification
or demographic tracking. As the Department of Justice
capital-case review committees show, some assistants
can have access to a full criminal file while decisionmakers see only race-blind information.

The Case for Blinded Prosecutors

Although defendants retain the ultimate choice about
whether to accept any deal, the prosecuting and
defense attorneys actually negotiate that deal, and
the prosecutor need not be exposed to the race of
the defendant. In some jurisdictions, plea bargaining
happens at arraignments with defendants in the same
room. But this practice is neither uniform nor necessary. Thus, the two steps that are conclusive for the
vast majority of cases—charging decisions and plea
bargaining—can potentially be blinded to race.

The success of the long-standing practice of blinding
in other contexts gives credence to our proposal that
prosecutors should be blinded to the race of criminal
defendants whenever possible. Prosecutors, like other
professionals, cannot be biased by what they do not
know. In addition to mitigating unconscious bias, the
blinding of prosecutors also mitigates any conscious
racism, which may infect some prosecutors.
Federal prosecutors already use a race-blinding
procedure for death penalty decisions. The Department
of Justice requires that attorneys on committees of
capital cases (which determine death eligibility) review
each defendant file only after information related to the
race of the defendant has been removed.60 Only paralegal assistants who collect statistics know the defendants’ races. The question is how far this practice can
and should be expanded. We believe there is potential
for broader use of race blinding by other prosecutors.
Prosecutors are a good target for race blinding given
their substantial power and impact, particularly with two
pivotal decisions: the filing of charges and the negotiation of plea bargains.

Charging Decisions
Prosecutorial practice varies in different jurisdictions. For
petty offenses, a prosecutor may make key decisions in
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Plea Bargaining

Limitations, Challenges, and
the Need for Pilot Testing
Although we argue for the value of race blinding procedures, we acknowledge that there will be difficulties and
limitations in implementing such a policy. Race should
have no legitimate role in the vast majority of charging
decisions. However, in rare situations, such as prosecutions for hate crime, the race of an alleged perpetrator is
relevant. In these cases, the necessary information can
be provided to prosecutors.
For cases in which race is irrelevant, the blinding
strategy will be effective at eliminating bias only to the
extent that prosecutors are unable to infer race from
other information available to them. Thus, it will be
necessary to remove information that could reveal race,
such as photos of a defendant; the defendant’s name;61
and, in racially segregated communities, the defendant’s
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address. The practicalities of removing all race-related
information could become complex. Further, race
blinding may not be feasible if photos contain relevant
information (such as defensive wounds on the defendant’s skin) or eyewitness testimony describes a perpetrator’s race.
To prevent prosecutors from inferring race from the
defendants’ names, court documents could instead identify defendants with assigned numbers (such as driver’s
license numbers). That said, removing names may have
other unintended effects, such as reducing empathy,
leading to harsher decisions toward anonymous defendants.62 An alternative approach would be the use of
random race-neutral pseudonyms to achieve anonymity
without erasing all trace that a person is involved.
The severity of punishment is a question for the legislature. If race blinding succeeds, it levels the playing
field for all by promoting equality, even if it decreases
bias favorable to White defendants (often referred to as
White privilege).63–65 Both unjustified leniency for Whites
and unjustified harsher punishments for Blacks were
revealed in 2015 by the U.S. Department of Justice Civil
Rights Division’s investigation of the Ferguson (Missouri)
Police Department. Of the many examples discussed in
the report, one clearly highlighted the double standards:
Whites were more likely to have citations, fines, and
fees eliminated by city officials, whereas Blacks were
punished for the same minor transgressions with expensive tickets and judgments punishing their perceived
lack of personal responsibility (pp. 74–75).66 That said, in
other contexts, punishments may be harsher for Whites
than for Blacks.17 Blinding may create racial equity for
both Black and White defendants.
Given that race blinding may not be feasible in some
situations, may fail, or may have unintended consequences, the best path forward is to pilot-test this intervention and gauge its effectiveness. Pilot testing would
allow researchers to uncover (and perhaps creatively
address) challenges in the practical implementation of
race blinding; evaluate on a smaller scale the precise
impact, success, and value of race blinding; and expose
any potential unintended consequences.33,67–69 Sequential rollouts in different jurisdictions are also valuable, as
they allow for continued monitoring and assessment in
varying contexts.
In theory, prosecutors could be blinded to other
information that may activate biases, including the

race of the victim or the gender of the defendant or
victim. These reforms should be considered on their
own merits, including whether empirical evidence
demonstrates that these variables are biasing prosecutorial decisions in a systematic fashion that is irrelevant
to the proper application of the law. These considerations would also apply to whether blinding could be
expanded to other decision-makers, including defense
attorneys, judges, juries, and parole boards.

Impact and Cost Effectiveness
The need to eliminate race bias in prosecution is urgent.
Racial biases can substantially distort decisions,61,70 and
prosecutorial bias alone leads to a substantial increase
in the duration and severity of punishment for minorities. A study using 222,542 cases in New York County
during 2010–2011 found that Black defendants were
10% more likely to be detained pretrial compared with
White defendants charged with similar crimes, and
they were 13% more likely to receive offers of prison
sentences during plea bargaining.71 Given that a prosecutor typically handles dozens of felonies and over a
hundred misdemeanors per year,72 the impact of racial
bias is compounded. Approximately 27,000 state prosecutors deal with 2.9 million felony cases per year, and
6,075 federal prosecutors secure 82,000 convictions
per year, not to mention the millions of prosecutorial
decisions that are made on misdemeanor charges.73,74
Two-thirds of those convicted of a felony go to prison,
and the average sentence is about five years,75 at a cost
of $25,000 per prisoner per year.76 Therefore, given that
prosecutors are responsible for hundreds of personyears of incarceration annually and thus millions of
dollars of public money, even a marginal reduction in
bias may have a substantial effect.
These numbers have an impact that extends beyond
the direct experiences of people sentenced to do time.
As The Pew Charitable Trusts reported in 2010, the
income of households and the educational success
of children in those households decline when parents
are put in jail.77 The tangible and intangible costs to
the prisoners, their families, and the broader society
are tremendous.
Successfully blinding prosecutors to defendants’
race may also improve the perceived legitimacy
of prosecutorial decisions, which may enhance
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compliance with the law.78 As important as anything
else, it would advance some of the fundamental goals
of our government: the equal treatment of all citizens
and justice for all.

A New Standard: Blinding Prosecutors
to Defendants’ Race
If race blinding proves to be effective after pilot testing,
we recommend that local and state prosecutors and
the federal Department of Justice adopt race blinding
as a uniform practice. We recommend that national
and statewide associations of prosecutors (for example,
the National District Attorneys Association), as well as
broader organizations such as the American Bar Association (ABA), support implementation of the reforms.
Furthermore, we recommend that this imperative be
written into ethical codes and guidelines, such as the
U.S. Attorneys’ Handbook Chapter 9-27.000 (USAM)
and Rule 3.8 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (1983). Our reform also relies on the ethical
behavior of attorneys, police, and other intermediaries who would not leak the race of the defendant to
prosecutors. Adoption of this norm into the current
ethical code could build on the current norms of
confidentiality.
Race disparities pervade criminal justice decisionmaking in America. Among criminal-justice actors, the
decisions of prosecutors are the least reviewable, are
exercised with the most discretion, and are impactful.
Blinding has been used as a tool to reduce gender
and race discrimination in many fields, and its value
is grounded in empirical evidence. We believe that
blinding prosecutors to a defendant’s race wherever
feasible is a timely and important proposal.
We acknowledge that there will be practical implementation challenges and risks. Our primary aim with
this proposal is to instigate a discussion on the merits
and drawbacks of blinding prosecutors to race and
to encourage pilot tests. The Department of Justice
demonstrated the feasibility of race blinding for federal
prosecutors60 and state prosecutors could follow suit
with similar procedures for their own death penalty
cases. Expanding race blinding to other prosecutorial
decisions may seem impractical; but, if the history of
blind police lineups is any guide,55 the jurisdictions most
committed to racial equality and behaviorally informed
policymaking will prove otherwise.
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